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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to question the almost universal assumption that words are 
signs.  I first offer an interpretation of that assumption, which links it to the so-called thesis of 
the arbitrariness of the sign.  I then draw out and explain one key commitment of the 
assumption, on that interpretation.  This commitment of the view that words are signs appears 
to be open to an obvious objection, which I briefly explain. 
  
1.  What Everyone Assumes 
Almost everyone assumes that words are signs, although they often do so without noticing.  
Some hesitate a little before openly endorsing the assumption—either because they have a 
very particular understanding of what signs are, or because, once they are consider the 
assumption explicitly, they find they are not sure what signs are at all.  But those who hesitate 
because they have a particular understanding of the notion of a sign are usually prepared to 
accept something a little looser or more contextualized, such as that languages (as wholes) are 
systems of signs; for my present purposes I will count such looser or more contextualized 
assumptions as just versions of the assumption that words are signs, and will take the 
assumption that words are signs itself as being to be understood in some suitably 
contextualized way.  And those who hesitate because they find they are not sure what signs 
are, when they consider the issue explicitly, generally turn out to be committed to the same 
fundamental things as those who accept more easily that words are signs. 
   When the assumption that words are signs is made, it is made very quickly, and then 
scarcely re-examined.  It seems to be thought that it is just obviously true, rather as if it was a 
commonly observed empirical truth, similar in kind to the truth that human beings are made 
of flesh and blood.  Because it seems just obviously true, this assumption is also thought not 
to be very important for any of the really interesting issues in the philosophy of language: it is 
as if it is not really part of the philosophy of language—or any kind of philosophy—at all.  
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Once the assumption has been made, it is put on one side, so that we can get on with what 
seems really to matter.
1
 
 My aim here is just to present an interpretation of the assumption that words are signs 
and to bring out one core commitment of the view.  I hope it will then be clear that the 
orthodox view is at least open to question. 
  
2.  Arbitrariness and the Notion of a Sign 
What is it to think that words are signs?  The problem is not to understand what the word 
‘sign’ means: perhaps we understand that well enough, or perhaps not, but it is not to the 
purpose.  What we need to do is, rather, to understand what is really being assumed when 
people say—or more often simply presuppose—that words are signs.  What general picture of 
language is involved here?  What particular commitments are undertaken? 
 The assumption that words are signs is so widespread that there is little point in 
choosing some particular text in which the assumption is made and analysing that.  The best 
we can do is to offer a provisional account on the basis of general reflection, in the hope that 
people will simply recognize it as the core of what they have in mind, and then to use that as 
the basis of a further elaboration of the commitments of the view.  I offer, then, the following 
proposal.  The one thing which is uncontentiously associated with the notion of a sign, at least 
as that notion is involved in the assumption that words are signs (I am not worried here about 
whether road-signs, for example, are signs), is the notion of arbitrariness.  Something known 
as ‘the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign’ is taken both to be a simple truism, and to apply 
quite simply to language.  I suggest that we will understand what is assumed in assuming that 
words are signs if we suppose that what is assumed is whatever has to be the case to explain 
how it is that this ‘thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign’ seems both obviously true and simply 
applicable to language.  The idea is that once we understand the basis of the assumption of 
arbitrariness, we will understand the notion of a sign, as it is used in connection with 
language.  This seems a plausible interpretative proposal, because it is common to refer to the 
‘thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign’ as if it were simply a thesis about language—as if, in 
fact, the final word of the phrase ‘thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign’ were ‘word’, not 
‘sign’. 
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 The same applies to another common assumption: that words are types of mark or sound.  In fact, I think this 
other assumption—which has no real independent motivation—is actually just a way of fleshing out the 
assumption that words are signs.  There is not space here to argue for this claim, however. 
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 What, then, is the ‘thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign’?  Despite its fame, this 
‘thesis’ is rarely spelled out.  In fact, there are two distinct arbitrariness theses here.  One I 
will call the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign, speaking strictly.  We can formulate it like 
this: 
 
(ASn) For any sign s1, it is arbitrary that it is s1, rather than some distinct sign, s2, 
which is used to signify what s1 signifies. 
 
There are two things that need to be clarified about this.  The first is the notion of 
signification: this will be explained more fully a little later; for now signifying is to be 
understood just as what signs do.  The second thing that needs clarifying is the notion of 
arbitrariness involved here.  If a thesis like (ASn) is to have any plausibility, it cannot mean 
that there is no motive at all for choosing one sign rather than another to perform a particular 
signifying task, since it is clear that once one sign has been chosen for the task, and has 
become established in that role, there is a very good reason for people to conform to common 
practice.  Rather, the notion of arbitrariness needs to be understood in terms of 
counterfactuals.  A natural analysis of (ASn) is, therefore, something like this: 
 
(ASn*) For any sign s1, some distinct sign, s2, could easily have been used to signify 
what s1 signifies, instead of s1. 
 
If there is a long-established practice of using a particular sign, what we need to imagine is 
the possibility of an alternative practice having been set up at the outset, rather than some 
alternative sign being introduced now.
2
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 It is this kind of arbitrariness that Locke has in mind when he writes: 
 
Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be 
made use of by men, as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion, that there is between 
particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all 
men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea.  
(Locke 1700: III, ii, 1) 
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 The other arbitrariness thesis is naturally called the thesis of the arbitrariness of the 
signified; we can formulate it as follows for the time being (although this version will be 
revised shortly): 
 
(ASd) For anything d1 which is signified by a sign s, it is arbitrary that it is d1, rather 
than something distinct, d2, which is signified by s. 
 
Interpreting the notion of arbitrariness here as it was interpreted for (ASn), (ASd) says 
something like this: the same sign could easily have signified something else.  Where (ASn) 
keeps what is signified constant, and imagines a variation in the sign, (ASd) keeps the sign 
constant, and imagines a variation in what is signified.  (ASd) is an attempt to express the 
kind of arbitrariness which people have in mind when they contrast an arbitrary relation of 
signification with a relation based on resemblance.  (The locus classicus for the contrast is 
Plato’s Cratylus, though what view exactly Plato is there endorsing is not immediately clear.) 
 (ASd) makes something explicit which perhaps was implicit in (ASn): that is, the 
tendency of the notion of signification to encourage the reification of what is signified.  In 
(ASd), we find ourselves explicitly quantifying over things signified.  I think this tendency to 
reification reflects something deep about the idea that words are signs—something which I 
will return to at several points later—but explicit ontological commitment can almost 
certainly be removed by some technical device.  If the apparent ontological commitment to 
things signified in (ASd) concerns you, imagine it removed by some more cautious 
formulation, or a different construal (exploiting a substitutional interpretation of the 
quantifiers, for example).  It will not be crucial to my concerns. 
 I have said that (ASd) expresses the contrast between arbitrary signification and a 
relation based on resemblance.  That might in itself seem problematic.  Here is C. S. Peirce 
making a famous distinction among different kinds of sign: 
 
Firstly, there are likenesses, or icons; which serve to convey ideas of the things they 
represent simply by imitating them. Secondly, there are indications, or indices; which 
show something about things, on account of their being physically connected with 
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them … Thirdly, there are symbols, or general signs, which have become associated 
with their meanings by usage.
3
 
 
We can leave aside what Peirce here calls indications (such as that dark clouds are an 
indication of coming rain), since these clearly do not involve signification in any sense that 
might be relevant to language.  But there is still a distinction here, within the category of 
signs, between what Peirce calls likenesses or icons, on the one hand, and what he calls 
symbols, on the other.  And this does seem to matter, because representation by likenesses, in 
Peirce’s sense, does not seem to be arbitrary.  In part, this seems to matter for quite general 
reasons: it is hard to rule out the possibility of something counting as a language even though 
it contained signs which functioned by resemblance.  But it has also often been thought that 
actual languages already contain words which function in this way: onomatopoeic words, for 
example, are commonly thought to represent what they do in virtue of some resemblance. 
 Those who hold that words are arbitrary signs tend not to give much weight to 
onomatopoeia.
4
  I think they are right not to, given their general view, but the possibility of 
likenesses, in Peirce’s sense, and the actual existence of onomatopoeia, can be used to clarify 
what really lies behind the arbitrariness theses. 
 Likenesses create a problem for the thesis of the arbitrariness of the signified only if in 
their case ‘signify’ means something like represent by resemblance.  If this is a distinct kind 
of signification, it cannot be true in general that the same sign could have signified something 
quite different—indeed, arbitrarily different.  For the same sign could not have represented 
something arbitrarily different by resemblance.  In order to defend the thesis of the 
arbitrariness of the signified, we need to claim that it is signification of the same kind, and in 
the same sense, which is involved in what is done both by symbols and by likenesses, in 
Peirce’s terminology: it is just that in the case of likenesses, this common task happens to 
have been done by means of resemblance. 
 That means that in order to understand the arbitrariness theses properly, we need to 
focus on the notion of signification.  Signifying has so far been introduced just as what signs 
do; that will not be enough to stop representation by resemblance being a distinct kind of 
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 Peirce (1894: 5) 
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 Thus Saussure clearly does not take the existence of onomatopoeia as presenting a significant objection, even 
though he gives no compelling reason for setting it aside: see Saussure (1922: 101-2). 
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signification.  The natural response is to associate signifying specifically with symbols, in 
Peirce’s sense.  So we can say: 
 
(Sig) Signification is the kind of meaning which symbols have. 
 
If this is right, Peirce’s distinction between likenesses and symbols, within the category of 
signs, can be seen to depend on the thought that both likenesses and symbols have the kind of 
meaning which symbols have—though, of course, they have it in different ways, in virtue of 
different particular relations to what is signified. 
 In order to make (Sig) more precise, we need to spell out a little more what is involved 
in the notion of a symbol.  Peirce says that symbols ‘become associated with their meanings 
by usage’.  This does not itself make the contrast with likenesses clear.  Perhaps we can make 
the point more carefully as follows: 
 
(Sym) A symbol is a sign which means what it does just in virtue of its location in 
some context which could easily have been otherwise, and not in virtue of the 
qualitative character of the sign itself.
5
 
 
 Next we need to explain in particular how likenesses can be signs, if (ASd) is true.  In 
the case of language, this will be explaining how onomatopoeic words can still be signs, as 
those who suppose that words are signs standardly assume they somehow are.  We need first 
to suppose that symbols are possible: that is to say, we need to suppose that it is possible to 
for something to have a certain sort of meaning just in virtue of being located in some easily 
variable context.  Suppose that is possible.  Then, given that the meaning which can be 
established in this way is signification, and signification is, by definition, the kind of meaning 
which all signs have, it seems we can say this: whatever any sign signifies could in principle 
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 The reference to a context which could easily have been otherwise is meant to allow that a range of different 
factors might determine the meaning of a symbol: it might be stipulation, for example; or some kind of 
convention (which is presumably what Peirce means by ‘usage’); or something else.  The idea that the context 
could easily have been otherwise—we might easily have made a different stipulation, there might easily have 
been a different convention—immediately makes room for the thesis of the arbitrariness of the signified: it 
seems that location in a different context would have given the same sign a different meaning.  So (Sig) and 
(Sym) together seem to give us (ASd). 
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have been signified by a symbol—that is, could have been signified by a sign which signifies 
what it does just in virtue of its location in an easily variable context.  Now consider in 
particular some likeness, a sign which signifies what it does by resemblance.  If symbols are 
possible at all, it seems that another sign could have signified what this likeness signifies, 
which makes (ASn) applicable to liknesses.  And, conversely, if symbols are possible at all, it 
seems that a particular likeness, a sign which in fact signifies by resemblance, could in 
principle have been located in some easily variable context, in virtue of which it would have 
signified something else.  And that seems to make (ASd) applicable to likenesses too. 
 But we may want to qualify this last point.  We may feel that it is essential to a 
likeness that it signifies in the way it does—that is, by resemblance.  So we may feel that 
whatever gets to signify something else, in virtue of its location in some easily variable 
context, is not actually the original likeness.  That is, in short, we may feel that it is essential 
to a sign that it signifies what it does.  In order to accommodate this point, we simply need to 
distinguish between the qualitative character of a sign, which is independent of what it 
signifies (as (Sym) insists), and other features which may include what it signifies.  We can 
then state the following modified version of the thesis of the arbitrariness of the signified: 
 
(ASd*) For anything d1 which is signified by a sign s, it is arbitrary that a sign of the 
qualitative character of s signifies d1, rather than something distinct, d2. 
 
 With this done, we have two plausible arbitrariness theses, and a generally plausible 
version of the conception of signs which is likely to be involved in the assumption that words 
are signs.  At the root of it all is the concept of signification, conceived of precisely as a kind 
of meaning that can be established by location in an easily variable context, such as 
stipulation or convention.  And that concept can be used to bring out the core of the 
assumption that words are signs.  The orthodox assumption amounts just to this: 
 
(LMS) Linguistic meaning is signification. 
 
If we accept (LMS), we will be committed to the following two arbitrariness theses about 
words, a thesis of the arbitrariness of words (AW) and a thesis of the arbitrariness of word-
meaning (AM): 
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(AW) For any word w1, it is arbitrary that it is w1, rather than some distinct word, w2, 
which is used to mean what w1 means. 
(AM) For anything d1 which is meant by a word w, it is arbitrary that a word of the 
qualitative character of w means d1, rather than something distinct, d2. 
 
 I claim that the assumption that words are signs is, at bottom, just (LMS), the thesis 
that linguistic meaning is signification.  Once this interpretation is accepted, it should 
immediately be clear that it cannot really be just obviously true that words are signs, for no 
claim about meaning—which the claim that words are signs has turned out ultimately to be—
can be just obviously true.   
 
3.  Symbols, Readiness, and Form 
The view that words are signs has turned out to be, at bottom, the view that linguistic meaning 
is signification, with signification understood as the kind of meaning that symbols, in Peirce’s 
sense, have.  Officially, symbols have their meaning in virtue of being placed in a context 
which could easily have been otherwise; and such contexts are always understood to include 
conventions of various kinds.  But what really dominates our conception of what symbols are 
and the kind of meaning they have is not convention, but stipulation.
6
  It is because stipulation 
is evidently possible that we are so confident that there can be symbols—and hence confident 
that, even if some signs signify by means of resemblance, the very same signs (or, at least, 
things of the same qualitative character) could have signified something else, and not by 
means of resemblance.   
 This means that in order to understand the view that words are signs, we need to 
understand stipulation.  Stipulation is, in the basic case, a linguistic act.  It involves a 
declaration in words, most obviously of the general form ‘Let this be that’, or ‘Let this stand 
for that’.  ‘This’ here is schematic for some way or other of picking out the item which is to 
be given a new role; and ‘that’ is schematic for some way of identifying the role which is to 
be given.  Of course, nobody really supposes that in the general case words have meaning 
because of some explicit stipulation of this form: there obviously need to be meaningful 
words in place for a stipulation to be made in words.  What is supposed, rather, is that the 
kind of thing which is done in a stipulation in words could, in principle, be done in some other 
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 Indeed, it is natural to think of a convention, in the relevant sense, as just a kind of collaborative stipulation.  
This idea obviously underlies Quine (1969). 
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way: by means of some kind of habituation within an implicit convention, for example.  But 
this only removes one respect in which stipulation is linguistic, in a crucial range of basic 
cases. 
 Consider again stipulations of the form ‘Let this be that’, or ‘Let this stand for that’.  
Such stipulations can only work if the role indicated by ‘that’ here is fixed and appropriately 
well-defined.  What the stipulation does is give to some new thing—the thing indicated by 
‘this’—an antecedently well-defined role.  That antecedently well-defined role is then used to 
shape the ways in which the thing which is given the role can be used.  In some cases, this 
role is not itself linguistic.  Suppose I say, ‘Let this pepper-pot be the Imperial Guard’, as I 
explain the final stages of the Battle of Waterloo in a slightly obsessive dinner-party 
conversation.  The ways in which the actual Imperial Guard were able to move on the real 
battlefield dictate the ways in which I can legitimately move the pepper-pot across the dinner-
table: I use the antecedent determinacy of those possible movements to constrain the 
legitimate movements of the pepper-pot, and that obviously requires the ways in which the 
actual Imperial Guard could move to be reasonably well-defined antecedently.  This 
antecedent determinacy is not itself linguistic, just as the use to which the pepper-pot is put is 
not naturally understood to be linguistic. 
 But consider a stipulation of a different kind, such as this one: ‘Let ‘yellange’ truly 
describe something just in case it is in the borderline between yellow and orange—just in case 
its colour is not quite clearly yellow and not quite clearly orange.  This seems a perfectly good 
stipulation, and the role of the term is appropriately well-defined (even if it is vague).  As 
before, the role which the term has to play is determinate, in the relevant sense, in advance of 
its introduction.  But in this case the determinacy is of a clearly linguistic kind, just as the 
thing which is given a role by the stipulation—the new word ‘yellange’—is itself clearly 
linguistic.  The role which the term ‘yellange’ is to play is linguistic in the following two 
senses: it is a role for a word (the stipulation gives ‘yellange’ a linguistic role), and it is a role 
which is defined here by means of other words: oversimplifying a little, the stipulation allows 
‘yellange’ to replace those other words in certain contexts.  This second point is the crucial 
one: the role which ‘yellange’ is to play is made determinate by words whose meaning is 
taken for granted.  I will return to that in a moment. 
 This point is of particular importance for our present concerns, when we consider the 
nature of the role which is assigned to ‘yellange’ in such a stipulation, and consequently the 
conception of meaning which is involved in the view that linguistic meaning is simply the 
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kind of meaning which can be introduced by stipulation—which is, after all, just the view that 
words are signs.  I introduce the term ‘yellange’ to play a role which is defined by means of 
other, antecedently understood words.  What this does, in effect, is to license the use of the 
term ‘yellange’ in place of other words (either the words which I use to define the new term’s 
role, or certain closely related words) in certain contexts.  In making the stipulation, I am 
saying, in effect, that ‘yellange’ and these other words which it can replace in certain 
contexts, are to be counted as equivalent in meaning for certain purposes.  And this, in effect, 
defines (or partially defines) the notion of meaning which is established by stipulation.  It is 
immediately fixed that the same meaning—an equivalence for certain purposes—can be the 
meaning of qualitatively different words: the words which our new term can replace in certain 
contexts, on the one hand, and whatever term I choose to introduce by stipulation, on the 
other.  So whatever it is about the words that my new term replaces which is important for my 
stipulation, it cannot be something which only those words, or only words with that 
qualitative character, could possess.  For stipulation, I ignore the qualitative character of the 
words which fix the role which the new term has to play, just as much as I ignore the 
qualitative character of the new term itself. 
 We are dealing here with stipulation which is linguistic in the two special senses I 
noted before: it introduces a role for a word (a linguistic role), and the role it introduces is 
defined by means of words.  And this last sense in which such stipulation is linguistic has 
been seen to be characterizable as follows: it is a matter of this new term being substitutable, 
in certain contexts, and for certain purposes, for certain other words.  The role which is 
antecedently fixed, which the stipulation then exploits, is introduced in just these terms: as the 
role played, in certain contexts, and for certain purposes, by certain words.  And this shows 
the deep assumption on which the view that words are signs depends. 
 It is accepted that words cannot, in general, be meaningful in virtue of literal 
stipulation.  Instead, it is supposed that something else—some kind of habituation within an 
implicit convention, for example—might do the work of an explicit declaration in words.  But 
now we can see exactly what that something else has to achieve.  It has to set going new 
terms: it has to give them a role.  But the role it gives them has to be one for which the 
qualitative character of the terms themselves is irrelevant.  It seems that it can only do that in 
virtue of the role being somehow defined independently of those terms, and defined in such a 
way as to ensure that the qualitative character of the terms is irrelevant.  At this point the role 
cannot be defined just as the role played, in certain contexts, and for certain purposes, by 
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certain words.  It must be a role which is fixed in some way independently of language, if we 
are to make sense of achieving what explicit stipulation achieves but without a declaration in 
words.  It must be a role which is fixed by what is, in some sense at least, outside language. 
 What is to be found outside language, which might determine the role that words can 
play?  There are two kinds of answer, each associated with a different tradition in the 
philosophy of language.  On the one hand there is the world, which we can engage with 
linguistically in various ways—most obviously by describing it, but also by asking questions 
about it, by asking others to change it, and so on.  And, on the other hand, there is thought, 
which we might suppose is independent of language, and which we can engage with 
linguistically by expressing it in various ways—in asserting, ordering, and asking questions.  
If we hold that linguistic meaning is the kind of meaning which can be introduced by 
stipulation, and that this can be done even when no declaration is made in words, we have to 
suppose that the world itself, or thought itself—or some combination of the two, perhaps—
defines the roles that words can play if the world is to be described or thought expressed.  
Words have to be the representatives of the world or of thought, in such a way that the nature 
of the world itself, or of thought itself, determines how words may legitimately be used—at 
least in combination with other words—very much as the legitimate use of the pepper-pot in 
my explanation of the Battle of Waterloo is determined by the possible movements of the 
actual Imperial Guard.   
 This reveals the deep assumption which underlies the view that words are signs.  The 
assumption is that there is some kind of equivalence—one might say isomorphism—between 
words and what lies outside language.  But the assumption is very hard to make precise: in 
part, I think, because it is hard to understand what is required when the requirements of 
stipulation are extended beyond declarations in words.  I will begin by offering a 
characterization of the assumption which anticipates the problem I will later find in it.  This 
characterization is metaphorical in an obvious way.  I will then present a natural and 
suggestive way of cashing out that metaphor, by means of another metaphor.  In the next 
section I will offer an interpretation of what underlies that second metaphor. 
 Here, then, is the first characterization of the assumption which underlies the view that 
words are signs—the characterization which shows what I think is ultimately wrong with it.  
In this guise I call it a readiness assumption, and formulate it like this: 
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(Ready) Whatever can be described or expressed in a language is already, in itself, 
ready for that language. 
  
 Clearly, the key to understanding this readiness assumption is understanding the 
metaphorical use of the notion of readiness at its core.  It is not altogether easy to do this 
without begging the question against the readiness assumption.  But there is a suggestive 
proposal which we can use to make some headway.  It is natural to understand the metaphor 
or readiness in terms of another metaphor—one of shape—as follows: 
 
(ReadyF)  The world (or thought) is ready for a language if and only if the world has 
the same form as that language. 
 
If we understand readiness in these terms, we make the readiness assumption equivalent to the 
central thesis of the so-called ‘picture’ theory of meaning which lies at the heart of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.7  And that should not be all that surprising: the comparison between 
the fixing of the meaning of a word by stipulation, and the fixing of the legitimate use of a 
pepper-pot in explaining the final stages of the Battle of Waterloo, is exactly the kind of 
comparison which Wittgenstein’s theory was inspired by.  I suggest, then, that we try to 
understand exactly what it is that the readiness assumption amounts to—exactly what it is that 
the view that words are signs is committed to—by taking readiness to be defined by 
(ReadyF), and trying to work out independently what it might be for the world (or thought) to 
have the same form as language. 
 Let me summarize the claim I am making.  One can only hold that linguistic meaning 
in general is the kind of meaning which can be introduced by stipulation—which is what the 
view that words are signs amounts to—if one supposes that the world, or thought, has the 
same form as language.  It is only if one makes that supposition that one can think that mere 
location in some easily variable context is enough to endow something with meaning: the 
context must be rich enough to shape what anything placed in it can mean.  The task now is to 
try to understand what this same-form assumption really amounts to. 
 
4.  Readiness, Isomorphism, and Correspondence 
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 Wittgenstein (1922). 
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How are we to understand the notion of readiness, or sameness of form?  It is natural to 
understand sameness of form as isomorphism (which term’s etymology suggests that it itself 
means sameness of form), with isomorphism being understood in something like the way that 
is familiar in mathematics.  In the mathematical sense, two structures are isomorphic just in 
case there is a one-to-one correspondence between them.  This might seem a bit ambitious 
(there might be elements of the world or thought to which no linguistic items correspond).  So 
a language might be said to be isomorphic with the world (or thought) in a looser sense, just 
in case there is a mapping function from language to the world (or thought), such that each 
unit of the language is mapped onto exactly one element of the world (or thought).  Even this 
is likely to be more demanding than is plausible, since there will be many expressions 
(quantifiers and logical constants, for example) which are not likely to be counted as 
meaningful in virtue of being mapped onto items of the world: so the strict mapping claim 
will only be held to apply to a certain class of basic sentences and their constituents. 
 Even when it is understood in this restricted way, however, this way of understanding 
sameness of form yields an intuitive, and quite demanding, interpretation of the notion of 
readiness—an assignment interpretation—which we can formulate as follows: 
 
(ReadyA)  The world (or thought) is ready for a language if and only if nothing more 
than an assignment of items in the world (or thought) is needed to render the 
(basic) units of that language meaningful. 
 
An assignment relation, in the relevant sense, will be one which assigns exactly one item in 
the world (or thought) to each relevant element of a language.  If the readiness assumption is 
true, with readiness understood in terms of assignment, two things will be true of the relation 
between language and the world (or between language and thought).  First, the structure of 
language—once we are really clear about it—will be revealing of the structure of the world, 
or of thought.  And, secondly, the relation between language and the world, or between 
language and thought, will be, in a certain sense unproblematic: it consists just in a pairing of 
elements of language with elements in the world or in thought, and all that needs, in principle, 
to be discovered when one tries to learn a language is which elements of the world or of 
thought the elements of the language are paired with. 
 On one version of it, the assignment interpretation of readiness tends towards 
ontological extravagance, of a kind which is familiarly provoking.  In order to make literal 
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sense of the notions of assignment and mapping we need to suppose that entities in the world, 
or in thought, are assigned to the relevant linguistic units.  And this looks as if it is likely, at 
the very least, to encourage us to posit a distinct category of entity for each distinct basic 
category of language.  So, in the case of the kind of theory for which it is items in the world 
which are assigned to linguistic units, there will be objects (in a certain technical sense) 
corresponding to the category of singular terms, qualities corresponding to one-place 
predicates, relations corresponding to many-placed predicates, and facts or states of affairs 
corresponding to (at least some true) sentences. 
 One version of the readiness assumption, on the assignment interpretation, finds a 
structure in the world which is isomorphic with the structure of sentences.  There is another 
version—one which takes language to be grounded in the first instance in relations to thought 
rather than to the world—which finds a similar structure in thought.  If we put the two 
together, we get something like a traditional correspondence theory of truth.  The traditional 
correspondence theory claims that truth is to be understood in terms of a certain relation 
between the bearers of truth—the things which can be true—and the world.  The bearers of 
truth might be sentences, but they are more commonly the things expressed by sentences: 
thoughts, or, more ambiguously, propositions, both of which have the structure of sentences.  
And the traditional form of correspondence theory can then be characterized as follows.  It is 
generally assumed, to begin with, that there is a distinction between basic and non-basic 
sentences, or propositions.  (Very few actual correspondence theorists have held that the 
correspondence relation holds for all true sentences or propositions.)  Non-basic sentences or 
propositions are said to be true in virtue of the truth of basic sentences or propositions.  And 
basic sentences or propositions are held to be true in virtue of there being items in the world 
which correspond to them—facts.  For there to be a fact in the world which corresponds to a 
basic sentence or proposition is for something like the following to obtain: there actually 
exists something in the world, suitably independent of thought, which is structurally 
isomorphic with that basic sentence or proposition. 
 
5.  Readiness and Semantic Ascent 
We have seen what the readiness assumption looks like on the assignment interpretation: this 
interpretation is the one which is prompted by understanding the idea that the world (or 
thought) has the same form as language in terms of a quasi-mathematical notion of 
isomorphism.  It seems to capture the range of semantic theories which explain linguistic 
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meaning in terms of the correlation of both whole sentences and their components with 
suitably structured extra-linguistic items—whether they be in the world or in thought.  But my 
claim is that everyone who thinks that words are signs—everyone who thinks that linguistic 
meaning is the kind of meaning which can be conferred by stipulation—is committed to the 
readiness assumption.   But not all of these people are committed to the kind of semantic 
theory which can be associated with the assignment interpretation of that assumption.  Donald 
Davidson, in particular, has claimed that it is possible to do semantics without the kind of 
reification of meanings or things meant which is involved in the assignment interpretation 
(Davidson 1984). 
Davidson hopes to handle the central task of semantics, to explain how the meaning of 
whole sentences depends upon the meaning of their parts, by means of minimally reifying 
axioms which fix the semantics for parts of sentences, from which theorems can be derived 
which state the truth-conditions of whole sentences involving those parts.  Thus we might 
have basic axioms like these: 
 
(AxSal)  The thing referred to by the name ‘Sally’ = Sally; 
(AxTal)  The predicate ‘x is tall’ is true of something if and only if that thing is tall.8 
 
And from these axioms (together with a syntactic analysis and a rule of composition) we can 
derive a theorem like this: 
 
(TST)  The sentence ‘Sally is tall’ is true if and only if Sally is tall.9 
                                                 
8
 Note that I make no effort here to choose a predicate for which a simple semantic axiom like (AxTal) is likely 
to be uncontroversial: obviously ‘x is tall’ is both attributive and vague.  Just assume that these features of this 
predicate—which are, of course, very widely shared by predicates in natural languages—are handled in whatever 
way is best for a broadly truth-conditional semantics. 
9
 This theorem, like the axioms from which it is derived, is stated informally: in particular, there is no mention of 
the language to which the sentence belongs, or within whose framework it is interpreted; nor is there any 
mention of anything which fixes the occasion of use (which might perhaps determine that the name ‘Sally’ refers 
to one particular Sally).  I am happy to leave it informal, in order to remain neutral about the best way of making 
it more formal, judgement on which would involve making a decision on a particular style of semantic theory, as 
well as on some larger philosophical issues (such as the nature of words).  For the same reason, I leave it open 
how exactly theorems like (TST), which are supposed to state truth-conditions are reached: whether, in 
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And here we seem to have removed at least some of the ontological commitment which 
seemed the characteristic mark of the readiness assumption.
10
 
 Let us ask to begin with: how might a Davidsonian theory be thought to hold that the 
form of the world is the same as the form of language?  If we can understand that, we might 
hope to reach a more general statement of the readiness assumption. 
 The key lies in statements of truth-condition like (TST).  This—like the rest of the toy 
semantic theory from which it is derived—offers a homophonic semantics, in which we give 
the meaning of words and sentences by using those very words and sentences themselves.  
But even though the same words appear on both sides of statements of truth-condition like 
(TST), there is a well-known difference in their role: the words are referred to, in quotation, 
on the left, but used, unquoted, on the right.  There are two ways in which we might try 
spelling out the significance of this difference.  Suppose, first, that the sentence ‘Sally is tall’ 
is true.  In that case, we can imagine using (TST) to construct two different inferences, one 
running, as it were, from the right to the left in (TST), the other running from the left to the 
right.  Here is the right-to-left inference: 
 
(RL1) Sally is tall; 
(RL2) The sentence ‘Sally is tall’ is true if and only if Sally is tall; so 
(RL3) The sentence ‘Sally is tall’ is true. 
 
And here is the left-to-right inference: 
 
(LR1) The sentence ‘Sally is tall’ is true; 
(LR2) The sentence ‘Sally is tall’ is true if and only if Sally is tall; so 
(LR3) Sally is tall. 
 
(TST), which appears as both (RL2) and (LR2), is an instance of the following familiar 
equivalence: 
                                                                                                                                                        
particular, they are the result simply of a semantic theory, strictly so-called, or whether they depend on various 
pragmatic factors which determine how particular context-sensitive expressions are to be interpreted. 
10
 It is in fact an open question how successful Davidson ultimately can be in removing ontological commitment: 
it is striking that this toy fragment of a semantic theory contains no sentences involving quantifiers, for example. 
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(T) s is true if and only if p 
 
—where ‘s’ names a sentence, and ‘p’ is replaced by a sentence which says what s says.  In 
the right-to-left inference it appears as a principle of semantic ascent; in the left-to-right 
inference it appears as a principle of disquotation.  And we can obviously imagine a similar 
pair of inferences—with opposite conclusions—if we change our initial assumption and 
suppose that the sentence ‘Sally is tall’ is not true. 
 The significance of the difference between the mention of the sentence ‘Sally is tall’ 
on the left of (TST) and its use on the right lies in at least one of these inferences being 
significant.  We can use the right-to-left inference to explain what the readiness assumption 
might amount to in the case of a Davidsonian theory. 
 We might think that a significant inference represents a kind of objective grounding, a 
way in which the conclusion is necessitated objectively by something else—the premises—
being the case.  Within this framework, different directions of inference would represent 
different directions of explanation.  So the right-to-left inference might explain how the truth 
of a sentence was grounded in the way the world is.  It might be used to represent a certain 
understanding of the claim that the sentence ‘Sally is tall’ is true because Sally is, in fact, tall.  
(It is not obvious that there is a credible relation of objective grounding which might be 
represented by the left-to-right inference.) 
 It seems to me that this captures the core of the readiness assumption, at least as that 
applies to a broadly Davidsonian semantic theory.  I suggest that to accept the readiness 
assumption within that kind of semantic theory is to accept that, in the fundamental case, at 
least, these two things hold: 
 
(a) Sentences are made true by the way the world is; 
(b) The way the world is necessitates the truth of sentences by means of nothing 
but an operation of semantic ascent (the (T) schema applying in the right-to-
left direction).  
 
It is (b) which provides the key to the readiness assumption.   
 The notion of semantic ascent in play here is only well-understood for trivial 
(homophonic) instances of the schema (T), but we can define a generalized version of it: 
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(SA) A move of generalized semantic ascent is one which permits a valid inference 
from a judgement in which a sentence is used to a judgement about the 
propriety of using a certain named sentence which says what the originally 
used sentence says. 
 
(SA) applies not only to more informative (non-homophonic) instances of the (T) schema, but 
also to other schemata, which might be used to ground the correctness or appropriateness of 
the use of sentences in the thoughts they might express (as opposed to the states of the world 
they might be used to describe).  One such thought-directed schema might be this: 
 
(A) It is appropriate to use s if and only if it is appropriate to express the thought 
that p. 
 
  We can now use the notion of generalized semantic ascent to define the notion of 
readiness more generally, as follows: 
 
(ReadyS)   The world (or thought) is ready for language if and only if the propriety 
of using sentences is necessitated by the way the world is (or: what 
thoughts are properly expressed) on the basis of nothing but an 
operation of generalized semantic ascent. 
  
 This understanding of readiness, in terms of the notion of generalized semantic ascent, 
is plausibly understood to underlie the assignment interpretation of readiness presented in the 
last section—the interpretation characterized by (ReadyA).  The assignment interpretation is 
simply the result of understanding the notion presented in (ReadyS) in the manner of a 
particular, reifying style of semantic theory.  Semantic theories of that style will themselves 
be answerable to the kinds of consideration which are at work in the reasoning which 
underlies (ReadyS): they will have to yield an account of the correctness of uses of sentences 
which meets the kinds of condition imposed by such schemata as (T) and (A).  In that case, 
we can take (ReadyS) to be the basic account of the notion of readiness in play in the 
readiness assumption. 
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6.  Readiness and Suspicious Convenience 
There is a close relationship between the readiness assumption, on the assignment 
interpretation, and traditional correspondence theories of truth.  And the readiness 
assumption, even in its more generalized form, is open to at least one fundamental objection 
to such theories.  P. F. Strawson gives a hint of this objection in the following famous 
passage: 
 
But what could fit more perfectly the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is 
raining?  Of course, statements and facts fit.  They were made for each other.
11
 
 
Let us note, first, that this objection does not apply just to the relation between statements and 
facts, as that is understood by a correspondence theory.  It could be reformulated equally for 
the relation between sentences and thoughts, or for the relations between singular terms and 
objects, between predicates and qualities and relations, and between any type component of 
sentences and the corresponding (note the appropriateness of the term) type of concept. 
 Strawson’s objection to correspondence theories is this: correspondence theories make 
the relationship between language and the world suspiciously simple; the fit is just too 
convenient to be plausible, if the world is to be as independent of language as correspondence 
theorists generally suppose that it is.  And exactly the same objection applies to all forms of 
the readiness assumption: the readiness assumption makes the relationship between language 
and the world (or between language and thought) just too neat, too convenient to be plausible, 
if the world (or thought) is to be as independent of language as it is natural to think it is. 
 The reason why the relationship seems too neat is just this.  The readiness assumption 
supposes that nothing more than a step of generalized semantic ascent can be needed to take 
one from the world (or thought) to language.  And this is to suppose that the relation between 
the world, or thought, on the one hand, and language, on the other, meets a certain condition 
of epistemic convenience: it permits the appropriateness of the use of a sentence, on any 
particular occasion, to be justified by an inference of the fundamentally simple kind exhibited 
in (RL1)-(RL3) of the last section.  But what reason could we have for thinking that the 
relation was so convenient? 
                                                 
11
 Strawson (1971: 179). 
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 Certainly, this epistemic convenience cannot be required for language to have evolved 
to suit the world, if that is what we think.  Such evolution requires merely that language 
should have ended up capable of describing the world: there is no reason to think that this 
result is only—or even naturally—achieved in a way which presents us with such easy 
justification.  Nor is it credible to suppose that the real world—the world we take ourselves to 
be describing—is itself nothing but a construction of our thoughts, built to our specifications 
and to suit our epistemic convenience.  And exactly the same kinds of appoint apply to the 
relation between language and thought. 
 In fact, it seems clear that we would only have reason to believe in the readiness 
assumption if we thought that languages were in the first instance invented—with words 
assigned to things or to concepts by some kind of stipulation.
12
  And it is surely not hard to 
doubt that. 
 We seem to have come full circle.  The view that words are signs turned out, on 
investigation, to be the view that linguistic meaning in general is the kind of meaning that 
symbols have, the kind of meaning which is established by stipulation.  This model of 
language was seen to depend on the readiness assumption—the assumption that the world, or 
thought, is already shaped to provide the kind of determinate role for words to play which is 
needed if stipulation, or anything like it, is to be possible.  And it now appears that the 
readiness assumption is only credible if we think that languages were, in fact, introduced by 
stipulation.  That is to say, it is only reasonable to think that the relation between language 
and the world, or between language and thought, is of the kind which would be needed for 
language to be founded on stipulation if one already thinks that languages actually were, in 
the first instance, founded on stipulation.  And that is surely enough to make us question the 
view that words are signs.
13
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Interestingly (and ironically), Strawson himself seems to suppose just that: see Strawson (1980: 286). 
13
 I am extremely grateful to Piotr Stalmaszcyk for inviting me to give the talk at the 2009 PhiLang conference in 
Łódź on which this paper is based, and to many of the participants of that conference—I single out Jaroslav 
Peregrin for particular mention here—for helping me to get clear about what I wanted to say. 
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